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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is an exciting new technology with applications in
military, industry, and healthcare. These applications manage sensitive information in
potentially hostile environments. Security is a necessity, but building a WSN protocol is
difficult. Nodes are energy and memory constrained devices intended to last months.
Attackers are physically able to compromise nodes and attack the network from within.
The solution is Centralized Secure Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy
(CSLEACH). CSLEACH provides security, energy efficiency, and memory efficiency.
CSLEACH takes a centralized approach by leveraging the gateways resources to extend
the life of a network as well as provide trust management. Using a custom event based
simulator, I am able to show CSLEACH's trust protocol is more energy efficient and
requires less memory per node than Trust-based LEACH (TLEACH). In terms of
security, CSLEACH is able to protect against a wide range of attacks from spoofed
messages to compromised node attacks and it provides confidentiality, authentication,
integrity and freshness.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction

A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of microcontroller devices
designed to accumulate sensed data through wireless communication. Equipped with
transceiver, microcontroller, memory, and battery, sensor nodes collect various forms of
data from a sensor module. Early research focused primarily on energy efficient
solutions. Recently, security is becoming as important a topic. WSNs have potential in
medical, industrial and military applications. These applications have urgent need to
protect confidential data. However, developing a secure WSN protocol is not easy.
Sensor nodes operate in remote and sometimes hazardous environments inaccessible to
humans. Nodes must function without renewable energy sources for months.
Additionally, nodes may number in the thousands so slight changes to the cost of an
individual node can cause dramatic changes in the overall cost of the network. As a result
memory is limited. The purpose of this research is to develop a protocol capable of
satisfying the needs for security, yet remain energy and memory efficient. The scope of
this project will include researching WSN protocols, developing a new protocol, and
analyzing the new protocol in terms of network performance, memory requirements,
energy consumption, and most importantly security. Analysis of encryption algorithms is
outside the scope of the project. The new protocol introduced is called Centralized Secure
Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (CSLEACH).
So what are sensor networks? Sensor networks are networks of sensor nodes or
motes capable of performing automated monitoring or detection. Motes are devices
equipped with special sensor modules such as an electrocardiogram (EKG), motion
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sensor, or pressure sensor. Sensor nodes scattered throughout a region transmit data to a
gateway (aka controller or base station). The gateway is responsible for organizing and
transmitting data through the internet where the data is reaches a final destination for
storage or processing.
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Chapter 2 : Background and Related Studies

2.1 Security Attacks
WSN face unique set of security challenges [30]. WSN not only need
confidentiality, authentication and data integrity, but trust as well. Nodes deploy in
hostile environments where attackers can physically tamper with nodes. Nodes must be
produced cheaply to be cost-effective; therefore nodes are severely underpowered
compared to laptop class attackers. Below is an overview of potential attacks.

Hello Flood
The hello flood attacks nodes using a powerful transmitter by advertising routes to
the gateway. Nodes receiving the message see the attacker as a nearby node with a short
route to the gateway, but the attacker is actually outside the transmission range of most
nodes. Neighboring nodes become confused when data sent to the advertised route
disappear. The hello flood also works with replayed messages [19].

Spoofing/Message Altering
Spoofed and altered messages are simple attacks that modify messages to confuse
message recipients. Altered messages can spread false routing information to cause bad
routing decisions. Bad routing in WSN translates to longer paths and wasted energy. This
attack can be defeated by an integrity check such a Message Authentication Code
(MAC).
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Replay Attack
A replay attack captures and retransmits a message. Replay attacks are unaffected
by encryption. A nonce or timestamp is necessary to counter replayed messages.
Timestamps are preferred by WSN because they require fewer messages.

Sybil Attack
The Sybil Attack is a class of attacks that target trust based protocols. The Sybil
Attack relies on the ability to forge or mimic node identifications in order to produce a
large set of identifications to leverage a trust based system. By sending false trust
messages from a large set of nodes, the attacker can reduce the trust of innocent nodes.
Sybil is preventable with a key registration system.

Wormhole
A wormhole is a coordinated attack between two attackers capable of
communicating through other means than the normal communication. An example
would be two computers at opposite ends of the network, communicating through a
different frequency. The attackers share information only available to the other node. The
attackers then advertise a better route than the ones available, causing neighboring nodes
to use the attacker as an intermediary hop. This attack sets-up other attacks such as
selective forwarding.
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Selective Forwarding
Selective Forwarding works when an attacking node places itself in the routing
path of another node. The attacker then chooses which packets to forward to the next hop
and which packets to drop. The most basic selective forwarding attack is a sinkhole. A
sinkhole drops all arriving packets. Often routing protocols detect sinkholes as broken
links and attempt to avoid the link.

Compromised Nodes
It is hard to imagine someone physically breaking into a home computer to attack
the network, but this is the reality for WSN [27]. Imagine a sensor node deployed on the
battlefield to detect enemy movement. Attackers have physical access to the deployed
nodes. Once a node is compromised, the attacker has access to privileged information,
such as keys. How do we distinguish which nodes are compromised? This is where trust
protocols come in. Trust protocols have long existed for Ad-Hoc networks [11][15] .
Many trust based protocols use monitoring similar to watchdog [23]. The watchdog
monitors neighboring nodes for “misbehaviors” which are reported and evaluated. A
neighbors trust value entry is used to determine whether a neighbor is part of a trusted
route. Trust is often established through direct monitoring or distribution of trust tables
called Second Hand Trust (SHT).
Trust based protocols are not attacker proof, rather they are best effort attempts at
intrusion detection. Trust protocols often rely on special knowledge to determine
“misbehaviors” which usually means knowing the definition for legal application data.
Trust protocols are subject to myriad of problems, one of which is lying. Compromised
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nodes can collude to victimize innocent nodes by passing false second hand trust values.
Other problems include false positives and misdetections. Existing trust protocols for AdHoc networks rely on flooding to distribute trust. Flooding is unsuitable for WSN
because of the energy wasted with redundant transmissions. In the next section, we will
see and example of a WSN trust based protocol.

2.2 Security Considerations in WSN
Existing WSN security protocols use variations of symmetric key, MAC and predistributed key schemes to provide confidentiality, data integrity and authentication [18].
The reason many protocols converge to similar solutions is because of the lack of
alternatives.
Public key cryptography provides authentication and confidentiality.
Asynchronous feature in public key is useful for distributing keys and for broadcast
authentication. The high energy and processing overhead eliminates public key
cryptography as an option. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a new way to do public
key. ECC reduces key sizes while still providing the same level of security [32].
Unfortunately, ECC is still too computationally expensive compared to symmetric key
cryptography. As a result block ciphers dominate majority of WSN protocols with
extensive research into energy performance of block ciphers [1][10][17].
Traditional key exchange protocols use public keys. Most WSN protocols resort
to some form of pre-distributed keys [7]. Pre-distribution schemes can be categorized as
single key, pair-wise and random-key. In single key pre-distribution, all nodes in the
network share a single key. If the single key is ever made public, the entire network is
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compromised. In the basic pair-wise scheme, each node must store keys for n-1
neighbors. This approach requires large amounts of memory to store keys. In random key
pre distribution, nodes are assigned a random subset of keys from a key pool. Two nodes
are allowed to communicate if they have matching keys. It only takes a small subset of
keys to compromise the entire network.

2.3 WSN Security Protocols
SPINS is a protocol developed to solve the particularly difficult WSN problem of
broadcast authentication [28]. SPINS is built of two protocols called SNEP and μTesla.
SNEP provides security between two nodes, while μTesla provides broadcast
authentication using symmetric keys. SNEP uses block ciphers to encrypt messages in
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. μTesla provides broadcast authentication using a
delay strategy. μTesla begins with the gateway generating a key chain by continuously
applying a hash function and reversing the order of the keys. Each node entering into the
network must be bootstrapped with a key in the keychain. The bootstrapped key is a
commitment to the key chain because subsequent keys can be authenticated with repeated
applications of the hash functions to return to the initial key value. The network is
synchronized by intervals to which a new key is bound to. Packets send during an interval
contain a MAC encrypted with the intervals key. After each interval, the gateway releases
another key. A node can validate the key by applying the hash function to obtain the
previous rounds key.
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μTesla does have its flaws. Because nodes must buffer data before keys are
revealed, attackers can send random messages to overflow the nodes buffer. The
receiving node is unable to determine which messages are from the gateway until the key
is revealed.
2.4 LEACH-based Protocols and Security Enhancements
The basics of security are confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication, but in
the world of WSN, energy is always the first priority. Early protocols prolong the
operating lifetime of a network with clustering, multihop, and energy aware routing [6]
[8]. These strategies focus on reducing transmission costs because transmission energy
increases exponentially with distance. While these protocols are not designed for
security, they do provide a useful energy efficient template to develop a new protocol.
Numerous low energy protocols exist, but we will turn our attention to one specific
protocol, LEACH.

LEACH
Low Energy Adaptive Cluster Hierarchy (LEACH) is amongst one of the earliest
energy efficient protocols developed for WSN [13]. LEACH is organized into the three
stages cluster set-up, schedule creation, and data transmission (aka steady state). Nodes
form clusters under a cluster head (CH). A CH is responsible for coordinating
transmission schedules and aggregating data. LEACH elects CHs by probabilistically self
electing nodes. Candidates advertise their candidacy to neighboring nodes. Non-CH
nodes select the closest CH based on the strongest signal strength. Non-CHs respond with
a cluster join message to become cluster members (CM). CH is responsible for
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organizing CMs by providing a time schedule. Once clusters are organized, each cluster
can simultaneously collect sensor data from its members. This is possible with different
code division multiple access (CDMA) codes. A CH aggregates the data before sending it
to the gateway. Data aggregation saves energy by compressing data before transmission.

LEACH Based Security Protocols
SC-LEACH is a LEACH based protocol designed to optimize LEACH by fixing
the fundamental problems related to random CH election. SC-LEACH uses a predistributed key ring that is used to coordinate secure communication between a CH and
CM. SC-LEACH uses symmetric key cryptography along with a nonce to protect against
replay attacks [16].
Sec-LEACH uses random key pre-distribution scheme to coordinate clusters [26].
A key pool of randomly generated keys and ids are generated at the start of the network.
Nodes are assigned a string of keys selected by a pseudo random number generator. Each
node is also assigned a pair-wise key shared with the gateway. Nodes join clusters to
which they share a common key. Armor LEACH is another security protocol based on
Sec-LEACH [2].

TLEACH
TLEACH is a WSN trust protocol [31]. TLEACH contains two main components,
the Monitoring Module and the Trust Evaluation Module. Each node also maintains a
Neighbor Situational Trust Table (NSTT) filled with trust value entries for each pair of
node ids and situational operations. Situational operations, such as data sensing and
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routing, each have an individual trust value because nodes may not behave maliciously
for all operations. The Monitoring Module is responsible for detecting a neighbor's
“misbehaviors”. The Trust Evaluation Module evaluates which actions are safe to take
based on NSTT trust values. Like LEACH, clusters are formed through self election.
Instead of signal strength, TLEACH selects a CH based on the CH candidate with the
highest trust value. TLEACH’s transmission period is separated into multiple turns with
each turn ending in a trust update slot. During an assigned transmission timeslot, CMs
transmit data to their CH. When a node is not transmitting, the node probabilistically
determines if it will monitor a transmitting neighbor. Whenever a monitoring node
detects misbehaviors, the Monitoring Module files a misbehavior report tallying the
number of misbehaviors and good behaviors. The trust update slot allows the CH to share
its trust values with its CMs in a SHT message. Nodes update their NSTT with the SHT
and the misbehavior reports.
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Chapter 3 : CSLEACH
In this paper I introduce a LEACH based security protocol called Centralized
Secure LEACH. The motivation behind this project is the need for security and resource
efficiency in a WSN protocol. When building a WSN protocol, it is understood the
gateway cannot be compromised because the network cannot function without a single
point to collect data. Additionally, the gateway is unique because the gateway can be
more resource abundant than a sensor node. These resources include a rechargeable
battery, larger memory and greater processing power. To take advantage of these
features, CSLEACH utilizes the gateway for key management, and trust management.
CSLEACH builds on the LEACH algorithm by adding authentication, confidentiality,
integrity, freshness and trust. Like LEACH, each sensor node is able to directly transmit
to the gateway. Using a Key Distribution Center (KDC) approach, each node shares a
unique private key with the gateway. CSLEACH uses single key pre-distribution to share
a gateway private key that is used for broadcast authentication.
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Cluster Setup
Stage

Start

Key
Acquisition

Time
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Dissemination

Round Start

Trust Update

Transmission
Stage

Figure 1 CSLEACH state diagram.

CSLEACH is separated into the stages Round Start, Cluster Setup, Key
Acquisition, Time Schedule Dissemination, Transmission Stage, and Trust Update.
Below are detailed descriptions of each stage.
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3.1 CSLEACH Details
Round Start
Message
Sensor Nodes
Blacklist Message

Cluster Head Self Election

Cluster Head
Advertisement

Cluster Join
Message

Request Member
Session Keys

Member Session
Keys

Self Elected
Cluster
Heads

Transmission
Schedule

Cluster
Members

Transmitting Data

Aggregate Data

Request Trust Check

Respond Trust Check
Gateway

Figure 2 CSLEACH Message Transmissions

CSLEACH is organized into periods called rounds. At the start of each round,
session keys are distributed to prevent stale keys. Sensor nodes each possess two
permanent keys, a Gateway Private Key (KCTRL) and a Node Private Key (KP). As nodes
initially enter the network, they enter in a receiving state. Nodes wait patiently for a
message from the gateway which indicates the beginning of a round.
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Round Start

Figure 3 Round Start Message Frame

Each round is triggered by a Round Start Message from the gateway which
functions as a synchronization message. The message distributes a Session Template (T)
and an Network Key (KN) used to cheaply produce Session Keys and MAC Keys. The
Session Key (KS) encrypts communications between nodes and the gateway, and
communications between a cluster head (CH) and a cluster member (CM). The MAC
Key (KMAC) is used to encode a MAC to provide integrity protection.
KS = HMAC (T, KP)
KMAC= KS  KN

T is hashed with a HMAC using the key KP. As long as the KP is kept safe, a new session
key can be generated each round. Similarly, a Gateway Session Key (KGS) can be
produced by hashing T using KCTRL All messages contain a timestamp to prevent replay
attack.
The Round Start Message is unique because the message must first be decrypted
before the integrity of the message can be validated. This is because the KMAC for each
round is unique, and a new KMAC depends on KN which is part of the Round Start
Message.
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Cluster Setup Stage
Once the network synchronizes using the Round Start Message, nodes enter the
Cluster Setup Stage.

Figure 4 Blacklist Message Frame

The gateway first distributes a blacklist to warn nodes of malicious or faulty nodes. The
blacklist is used to reject malicious nodes from becoming Cluster Heads (CH). The
blacklist message contains a Maximum ID Value and a list of blacklisted nodes. Nodes
entering into the network have sequential IDs. The Maximum ID Value is used by nodes
to reject any ID with a greater value which allow nodes to reject invalid IDs. The black
list message is encrypted with the KGS which prevents older blacklists from being
replayed. It is important to note the advertisement message is encrypted with the KGS to
prevent nodes outside of the network from spoofing as CHs. The blacklist exists to
prevent compromised nodes from becoming a CH based the nodes reputation. The
blacklist does not prevent a compromised node from spoofing another node.
Once nodes receive the blacklist, nodes self elect to become cluster head. Nodes
elect by generating random numbers and following the same formula outlined in
LEACH. Nodes elected as cluster head advertise their candidacy to neighboring nodes.
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Figure 5 Cluster Head Advertisement Message Frame

The advertisement message contains the CH’s preset Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) code which enables clusters to communicate without interfering with
neighboring clusters. The remaining nodes select a CH based on a CH candidates signal
strength, and reject nodes listed by the blacklist.

Figure 6 Cluster Join Message Frame

Nodes become CM by responding to a chosen cluster head with a join message.

Key Acquisition
Before a CM can begin transmitting data to a CH, the CH must acquire KS for its
members to ensure data confidentiality. To obtain each CM’s KS, the CH compiles a list
of CM IDs in a Member Session Key Request Message.
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Figure 7 Round Start Message Frame

During this stage, the gateway can associate CMs with CHs. The associations allow the
gateway to scan for duplicate IDs and to select CM for Trust Checks from each cluster. If
a CM has insufficient trust, the gateway can withhold supplying a KS to prevent the CM
from communicating with the CH.

Figure 8 Member Session Key Response Message Frame

Once the keys are compiled, a response message is sent containing a list of session ids,
session keys, and a Trust Check Initialization Vector (TCIV). The TCIV will be used
produce a MAC called the Trust Check (TC). The entire key response message is
encrypted using the CHs private key.
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Time Schedule Dissemination

Figure 9 Time Schedule Message Frame

At this point in the protocol, a CH will have a list of session keys and TCIVs. The
CH is responsible for coordinating the Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) section
of the protocol. The CH is responsible for assigning timeslots for CM to transmit their
sensor data to the CH. For every node the gateway does not provide a KS, the CH will not
be able to transmit a time schedule to that node. Nodes that do not receive a time
schedule will no longer participate in the protocol and must wait for the next round.
Accepted members are assigned timeslots designating when a node can transmit.

Transmission Stage
CSLEACH partitions transmission periods into turns, as seen in TLEACH. Each
CM will transmit one timeslot each turn. After a turn is complete, the next turn begins
until a preset number of turns are reached. Greater turns equates to smaller round setup
overhead per transmission and conversely more memory required by the CH. In addition
to transmitting the sensor data, it is the responsibility of the CM to maintain a MAC of all
of its transmission for a given round. This MAC is called a Trust Check (TC). The MAC
produced uses the TCIV given by the gateway. The TCIV must be unique each round
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because a nodes private key is used to encode the TC. If nodes transmit predictable
patterns of data, and the same TCIV is used each round, then the encrypted data could fall
victim to known plaintext attacks.

Figure 10 Data Transmission Message Frame

Once the transmissions are complete, the CH will aggregate data and send the
data to the gateway. The data aggregation must be lossless to ensure the gateway is able
to retrace the source node ID of sensor data. This is important for the gateway to produce
a MAC to compare to the TC produced by a CM.

Figure 11 Aggregate Data Message Frame

Trust Update
After a round, the gateway must evaluate the performance of each node. The
gateway is able to reproduce a TC for each CM based on the data received by each CH.
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To verify if the TC is correct, the gateway selects CMs to sample TCs. The trust selection
probability determines how many CMs are selected by the gateway.

# CM selected per cluster = trust selection probability/CH election probability

Figure 12 Trust Check Request Message Frame

The gateway sends a TC request message to randomly selected CMs. The gateway also
computes a TC value from the aggregate data for the selected node. If the TC from the
node mismatches the TC from the gateway, both the CH and the selected CM are
punished.

Figure 13 Trust Check Response Message Frame

30

Keys
Gateway
Private
Key

Owner
Gateway

Origins
Randomly
Generated

Users
Gateway,
Registered
Nodes

Gateway
Session
Key

Gateway

HMAC (T,
Gateway
Private Key)

Gateway,
Registered
Nodes

Node
Private
Key

Node

Randomly
Generated

Node,
Gateway

Node
Session
Key

Node

HMAC (T,
Node Private
Key)

Node,
Gateway,
Cluster Head,
ClusterMember

Mac Keys

Node

<Encryption
Key>  K N

Node,
Gateway,
Cluster Head,
ClusterMember

Purpose
Prevent nodes not
registered with the
gateway from participating
in communications.
Prevent nodes not
registered with the
gateway from participating
in communications and to
prevent overexposure of
the Gateway Private Key
Protects communications
between a node and the
gateway from the attacks
from a compromised
Cluster Head.
Protects communications
between a Cluster Head
and Cluster Members,
from unregistered nodes
and compromised nodes.

Integrity protect
messages.

Usage
To Encrypt the
Round Start Message.

To Encrypt the
Blacklist Message,
Cluster Head
Advertisement
Message,
Cluster Join Message.
To Encrypt
Trust Check Response
Message,
Aggregate Data
Message.
To Encrypt
Member Session Key
Request Message,
Member Session Key
Response Message,
Time Schedule
Message,.
Trust Check Request
Message
To Integrity check the
Member Session Key
Request Message,
Member Session Key
Response Message,
Time Schedule
Message,
Trust Check Request
Message.

Note:
Network Key (KN) and Session Template (T) are components of the Round Start Message.
Node Keys are designated Cluster Head Keys and Member Keys dependant on the current role of
the node.
Table 1. CSLEACH key table.

31

Trust mechanism
CSLEACH employs a trust mechanism specifically catered to the unique
relationship between CHs and CMs. As an intruder, the role of CH is very salient because
CHs are responsible for routing data from CMs. CSLEACH uses two thresholds termed
Clusterhead Trust Threshold (CTT), and the Member Trust Threshold (MTT). Trust is
scaled between 0 and 100 and nodes begin with a trust value of 100. Nodes with trust
above the CTT are privileged to become a CH. Nodes with trust above the MTT are
allowed to participate as CMs. Nodes with trust below CTT have likely experienced
communication problems and are at risk of dropping packets. These nodes are blacklisted
from becoming clusterhead. Nodes below the MTT are absolutely untrustworthy nodes
that are blacklisted and rejected from any session key requests. For nodes that cross the
MTT into the lowest trust region, their trust is automatically assigned zero trust. The CTT
must be much greater than the MTT to ensure the CH is able to reliably forward sensor
data. The CTT must be set strictly based on the noise level of the environment, whereas
the MTT can be more freely set based on how strict the network should scrutinize
suspicious transmission behaviors.

Trust Punishment
When TC validation fails, there are three possibilities. The first possibility is the
CH is omitting or modifying data. The second possibility is the CM lied on the trust
check. In the first two cases both the CH and the CM must both be punished because it is
impossible to determine who the offender is. The reasoning behind the punishment
scheme is the assumption that attackers are likely repeat offenders. A CH should be
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punished more severely because of the low probability of becoming CH, and the greater
potential for harm as a CH.
The third possible case is a faulty transmission. Wireless communications are
subject to interference causing bit errors. Any errors during the transmission period will
cause a mismatch in the TC. There are a few things that should be done by a media
access control protocol to remedy this problem. The protocol must provide a robust
retransmission scheme. Acknowledgments can become security risks as Wagner points
out [19]. CSLEACH helps faulty nodes by gradually recovering trust between rounds if a
node is accidentally punished. Redemption protects faulty nodes from becoming exiled
from the network for temporary interference.
CSLEACH’s trust protocol is configurable by adjusting the CTT value, MTT
value, CM and CH punishment values, and recovery value. All values range from 0 to
100. The recovery value should be much smaller than the CM and CH punishment
otherwise trust punishments will have no effect. The default configurations are CH
punishment of 15, a CM punishment of 10, and recover value of 1. The CTT is set to 60
and MTT is set to 30.

4.2 Protocol Comparison
LEACH [13]

TLEACH [31]

TLEACH
(Simulated)

CSLEACH

None

None

MAC

MAC

Authentication None

None

Pre-distributed
keys

Pre-distributed
keys

Confidentiality None

None

Symmetric Key
Encryption

Symmetric Key
Encryption

NSTT /
Monitoring
Neighbors

NSTT /
Monitoring
Neighbors

TC

Integrity

Trust

None
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Table 2. Protocol security comparison.

LEACH is not a security protocol, but it serves as a performance standard for both
TLEACH and CSLEACH. LEACH has the least amount of overhead and memory
requirements, but lacks in any security.
TLEACH is a purely trust based protocol intended to be coupled with other
security protocols designed to provide integrity, authentication and confidentiality.
TLEACH relies on message passing to distribute trust information amongst nodes which
translates to transmission overhead. For the purpose of comparison, TLEACH is
modified to adopt CSLEACH's key distribution mechanism which provides integrity,
authentication, confidentiality and freshness. The modified protocol is used as a
comparison against the efficiency of CSLEACH's trust protocol.
CSLEACH relies on the gateway as its TTP (trusted third party). CSLEACH
communicates keys through encrypted messages between a CH and the gateway. Since
LEACH is a two hop protocol, CSLEACH can use the gateway to detect errors and
attacks against forwarded data. The gateway needs greater memory capacity to store and
maintain trust table and key information. The gateway may cause scaling problems
especially during blacklisting and key requests.
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Chapter 4 : Performance Evaluation

Simulations were performed on the protocols LEACH, TLEACH, and
CSLEACH. A custom event base simulator was built to support memory, energy and
performance analysis. For fair analysis and comparison, LEACH and CSLEACH were
modified to adopt TLEACH’s multi-turn transmission stage. Additionally a similar key
scheme used in CSLEACH is adapted to TLEACH. Initial transmission rate is set to
20,000 b/s. Each round consists of 3 transmission turns, .6s transmission timeslot per
node and 1024 bytes of data per packet transmitted. The cluster head percentage is set to
5 percent with a maximum simulation time of 10 hours. Nodes are enclosed in a 100m by
100m region. The battery is set to 100 Watt-hours or 3600 Joules. Encryption and
decryption are both set to 3 micro joules per bit as data is encrypted using XTEA [35].
Transmission and reception is simulated based on the first order radio model as seen in
the LEACH paper. Transmission and reception components consume 50 nJ per bit and
100 pJ/bit/m2 of transmission amplification. TLEACH requires knowledge to determine
what is considered legal data in the application layer. The simulation assumes the sensed
data is legal if the data blocks form 32 bit blocks representing integer values less than
100. Simulations output results in terms of good data, bad data, lost data and total data.

4.1 Security Evaluation

External Attack Analysis
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External attacks were graded based on the ability of the attack to introduce bad
data into the network. Bad data is data from any attacker accepted by the gateway. If any
bad data is received by the gateway, the attack has succeeded. The first attack simulates
an attempt for the node to enter a cluster and transmit random data. LEACH failed as the
bad data was received by the gateway without incident. Both CSLEACH and TLEACH
prevented the attacking node from becoming a CH or CM because the bogus id provided
by the attacker was outside the maximum blacklist range. If the attacker opted to become
a CM, the gateway was unable to find a valid session key for the unknown id. The Sybil
attack would also fail because messages are encrypted with keys registered with the
gateway. An invalid key would prevent a CH from communicating with the attacking
node, or the attacking node from communicating with the gateway to obtain CM keys.
The failures of these attacks to join a cluster indicated subsequent attacks attempting
similar feats would fail as well.

Clock skew
Next we turn our focus to replay attacks against the start message. Clock
management and synchronization is a tricky issue. The clock skew should last no longer
than the time it takes to perform 1 round. Even with a 1 round clock skew, it is possible
to replay data transmissions between two turns during the transmission stage. The
problem is exacerbated by the possibility some clusters may contain only one CM which
reduces the time between turns.
The replay attack simulated steals and resends a start round message periodically.
Unsynchronized nodes searching for round start messages are forced to synchronize with
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the attacker. By extending the time after rounds before the controller sends a start
message, it is possible for the replayed start message to force all nodes into processing
clusterhead setup before the gateway sends its round start message. The replayed
message causes the network to become out of synch with the gateway. If the clock skew
is reduced and managed properly, the likelihood of a successful attack diminishes.
A point of interest is the how the network synchronizes. If the round start message
is used to synchronize the messages, then what is used to validate the timestamp on the
start message? This is a chicken and the egg problem where we choose to either protect
the start message against a replay, or we use the time in the message to synchronize our
clock.

Compromised Node Attacks
Various attacks were simulated against TLEACH and CSLEACH to test the
effectiveness of the trust mechanisms. Simulations were run with 50 total nodes with 10
percent compromised.
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Figure 14 Compromised node attacks and the effects on data transmission.

Under normal conditions both TLEACH and CSLEACH receive high percentage good
data.

Random Data
Random data is sent by compromised nodes to the CH. Compromised nodes
behave normally when assuming the role of CH. TLEACH peer monitors illegal data by
reporting misbehaving nodes. CH assisted monitoring enables the CH to remove data sent
from compromised nodes. Unlike TLEACH, CSLEACH is a pure media access control
protocol unaware of application data rules. Roughly 10 percent of the network data is bad
data which means CSLEACH failed to prevent any of the falsified application data from
reaching the gateway.
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Random Application Legal Data
From the perspective of an intelligent attacker, the attacker could simply follow
the application rules and introduce application legal random data. Application legal data
is data that is indistinguishable from normal data when scanned by TLEACH's
monitoring module. Both TLEACH and CSLEACH accepted bad data because neither
could tell the difference between the bogus data and the actual sensor data. The overall
amount of good data decreased as the network is burdened by the attacking nodes
attempting to transmit

Sinkhole
For an attacker, the CH is a more attractive target than just sending bogus data as
a CM. The following two attacks are variations of selective forwarding. In the sinkhole
attack, attackers assume the role of CH every round. Compromised nodes drop all data
received. TLEACH performs poorly against sinkhole attack because no monitoring is
performed on CH transmissions. Conversely, CSLEACH is almost unaffected by
attackers. Each time the sinkhole attack is performed, the CH fails a TC validation. Since
the CMs outnumber the CH, the CH is punished more harshly causing the CH to quickly
lose trust.

Selective Forwarding: Odd Packets
In the last attack, we attempt to forward odd packets received by the CH in an
attempt to confuse the trust protocols. TLEACH losses less data because half of all data
sent by CMs is received by the gateway. TLEACH is however unable to stop the constant
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loss of data because of the lack of monitoring on the CH. CSLEACH performs almost as
well against selectively forwarding odd packets as against a sinkhole. The TC selection
process forces the CH to guess which nodes the gateway will select. If half of the packets
are dropped, the gateway has a 50% chance to punish a CH for every CM selected. If two
nodes are selected from each cluster, the CH has a 25% chance of escaping TC
validation.

4.2 Throughput Evaluation
There are a few problems when comparing throughput for the LEACH based
protocols. The goal is to obtain a throughput representing optimal conditions. In order to
optimize throughput, the maximum allowed time for each stage must be minimized. The
problem lies in the randomness of CH election. The random nature of CH election does
not guarantee a constant number of CHs per round and therefore some rounds have fewer
CHs resulting in more CMs per cluster. In order to prevent large clusters from surpassing
stage limits, the maximum number of CMs is limited to twice the expected number of
CMs per cluster. A portion of CM candidates are dropped from a cluster if the cluster
reaches maximum capacity. Since each node can possibly reach twice the expected
cluster size, extra time must be allocated to the transmission stages incase a cluster of
maximum capacity exists. This means nodes are sleeping for long durations for smaller
clusters. This explains the high variability in results between each of the three protocols.
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Figure 15 Throughput versus number of nodes.

Figure 3 shows the network throughput peeks around 2500 b/s. This is only a fraction of
the 20,000 b/s throughput available for the network. Majority of the time is spent setting
up clusters, key management, and other coordinating tasks. The network begins to peek at
250 nodes where the network throughput begins to drop indicating the difficulty LEACH
based protocols have when scaling.
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Figure 16 Average node throughput versus number of nodes.

Figure 4 shows despite the increase in network throughput, the number of CM per cluster
increases at a much higher rate. As a result nodes are assigned shorter transmission times.
LEACH, TLEACH, CSLEACH produced similar throughput because the election
processes produces variable throughputs each round.
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Figure 17 Network throughput vs. number of nodes under optimal conditions.

Under optimal conditions, the CH election percentage elects the same number of CHs
each round. With optimal conditions, the maximum duration for each stage can be more
accurately bound. In figure 5, LEACH transmits over 100 b/s more than TLEACH and
CSLEACH for networks sized 300 and more. The increased throughput is a significant
portion of the 20,000 b/s maximum transmission rate. CSLEACH performs marginally
better than TLEACH.
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Figure 18 Average node throughput vs. number of nodes under optimal conditions.

Similarly, CSLEACH has a higher average node throughput than TLEACH. The
differences are so minute that variations in real performance may be unnoticed.

4.3 Memory Evaluation
WSN is a cheap solution to automated monitoring. Simulations record the
maximum memory needed at a sensor node and gateway. The simulator conservatively
approximates the number of bytes required by each protocol. ROM and memory for
encryption are excluded. Note the same maximum cluster size is limited to twice the
expected cluster size.
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Figure 19 Minimum memory required on sensor node.

In figure 7, TLEACH requires roughly twice as much memory as LEACH and
CSLEACH. The extra memory is used in the NSTT to store trust values. As the node
sizes increase, memory required increases. The NSTT not only stores trust for
neighboring nodes, but also nodes from second hand trust updates. CSLEACH requires
slightly more memory than LEACH to store keys.
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Figure 20 Minimum memory required on gateway.

Figure 8 shows CSLEACH with the highest required memory capacity on a gateway
node. CSLEACH uses extra memory to store trust values for each node. TLEACH and
MYLEACH both store keys at the clusterhead accounting for the extra memory over
LEACH. The CSLEACH approach reduces the overall cost to WSN compared to
TLEACH because only the gateway is required to store trust values whereas TLEACH
reproduces trust tables for each node. From a cost perspective, CSLEACH is far cheaper
to implement because of the lower memory requirements.
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4.4 Energy Evaluation
Surviving Nodes(50 Nodes) vs. Time(Hours)
Batteries Contain 0.05 Watt-hours(180 J) Energy
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Figure 21 Number of Surviving nodes vs. time.

Energy consumption is the most important gauge to determine if a protocol is
suitable for WSN. Figure 9 is the result of simulating 50 nodes with 0.05 watt-hour or
180 Joules of initial battery energy. Nodes experience energy drain during transmission,
reception, encryption and decryption. Figure 9 shows the number of total dead nodes in
the network with the passage of time. The two security protocols consume energy at a
much higher rate than LEACH because of the added energy drain from encryption,
decryption and frame overhead. CSLEACH and TLEACH implementations essentially
use the same key distribution and encryption methods, therefore the difference in power
efficiency is purely due to the trust management protocols. The simulation does not
address the internal processing energy of each protocol so actual performance may vary.
With that said, TLEACH is expected to expend more energy with the extra overhead
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from updating SHT. CSLEACH takes a different approach by spending more time
performing internal processing to produce a TC.

4.5 Error Tolerance Evaluation
CSLEACH

120

Average Trust

100
80
CSLEACH

60
40
20
0
0

1E-06

2E-06

3E-06

4E-06

5E-06

6E-06

BER

Figure 22 Effects of increasing BER on CSLEACH.

CSLEACH is not without its problems. Wireless communications is subject to bit errors
caused by collisions and interference. Not all data is likely to reach a CH without
alteration. If a robust retransmission scheme is in place, many distorted messages can be
fixed, however there are many cases where this is not possible. The simulator uses
negative acknowledgments (NACK) to retransmit data. There are risks to negative
acknowledgements. If the source address in the frame header is lost, retransmission is
impossible. Another possibility is losing data between stages. If a transmitting node sends
a corrupted message during the end of the stage, there will not be enough time for a
retransmission. The benefit of a NACK is the reduced volume of ACK transmissions.
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Figure 10 shows the effects of increasing bit error rate (BER) has on the overall
trust of the network. CH often lose trust quickly, but only until trust falls below the CTT.
Once trust is below the CTT, the node is restricted to the role of a CM. CMs are far less
likely to be punished, giving the node time to recover. For a high BER, the protocol
protects nodes from falling below the MTT. For an attacker, it is nearly impossible to fall
under the CTT with only attacking as the CH.

Trust Distribution for BER 3E-6
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Figure 23 Trust distribution for BER 3E-6.

The simulations uses the settings 60 for CTT and 30 for MTT. The CH punishment is set
to 20 while the CM punishment is set to 15. Figure 11 represents a network with BER of
3E-6. The network still functions because majority of the nodes have trust above the
CTT. As errors increase, figure 11 shows the majority of nodes dip below the CTT.
Nodes begin dropping because too few CHs are elected causing clusters to overfill.
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Trust Distrubution for BER 4E-6
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Figure 24 Trust distribution for BER 4E-6.

Under these conditions there are a few remedies. The trust punishment values for CH and
CM can be reduced. Another approach is to adjust the CTT to 50 so majority of nodes
qualify as CH. There is however another underlying issue which is the pool of possible
CH is much smaller. The CH election percentage now only represents a fraction of the
entire set of nodes. For future modifications, the election percentage should be based on
an adjustable CH election percentage broadcast by the gateway with the round start
message.
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Chapter 5 : Moving Forward
CSLEACH accomplishes its goals to conserve energy and provide security,
however there are many areas left for improvement.

5.1 LEACH Enhancements
The most difficult problem when optimizing the performance of a LEACH based
protocol is dealing with the random election process. The random election process elects
random numbers of CHs each round. Rounds with few CHs result in larger cluster sizes
which means more time required each stage to disseminate timeslot schedules, and
transmission timeslots. The maximum time allotted each stage must be buffered with
enough time to account for larger clusters. As a result, time is wasted when cluster sizes
are small. A deterministic election processes would reduce variability in CH election and
allow for better optimization of maximum round durations [12]. It would also be
beneficial to include the gateway in the CH election process so that the gateway could
incorporate trust information to select CHs. Incorporating the gateway could eliminate
the need for a blacklist stage in CSLEACH.
LEACH creates a unique traffic pattern when forming clusters. At the beginning
of each round, every Non-CH must select a CH. This creates a spike in traffic during the
beginning of stages where bandwidth is shared amongst large groups of nodes. This is
especially noticeable during simulation because the simulator spends a majority of its
time calculating collisions and backoffs. Random sleep durations were assigned before
each round to improve the runtime of the simulator. In a real WSN, the increased volume
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of collisions could cause increased corrupted packets at the start of a stage and
implementing a random sleep strategy could be beneficial.

5.2 Security Enhancements
After Thoughts on Attacks
One of the major flaws in CSLEACH is the lack of broadcast authentication once
a node is compromised. A compromised node has all the information necessary to forge a
start message. The gateway private key is the critical component preventing an external
attacker from sending a forged round start message. Compromised attackers have access
to all the necessary components to spoof a start message. A single compromised node can
perform a DOS (Denial of Service) attack against CSLEACH by attacking the
synchronization of the network. This weakness does point out the need for asynchronous
broadcast authentication. Possibilities include using Lamport's and Merkle's one-time
signatures [24].
To reach the true performance potentials of each algorithm, an efficient data
aggregation or compression algorithm is necessary. Since CSLEACH requires a lossless
aggregation schemes, the true gauge of how well LEACH, TLEACH, and CSLEACH
may depend on the aggregation algorithms allowed.
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Chapter 6 : Conclusion

WSN of the future will be energy efficient and secure. Developing such a protocol
is about tradeoffs. Often to fix a security risk, the protocol sacrifices its energy efficiency.
To make sensor nodes cheaper, we sacrifice security. CSLEACH attempts to interlace
security and energy efficient methodologies into a single protocol. CSLEACH is more
energy efficient, requires less memory per node than TLEACH and adapts a strategy for
evaluating trust independent of application data knowledge. CSLEACH relies on the
gateways superior resources to manage key distribution and trust management. By
increasing packet sizes, increasing transmission turns, and using energy efficient block
ciphers, SCLEACH can reduce the overhead from encryption and key distribution. As a
result of research, we have shown how difficult LEACH is to protect. While SCLEACH
has much to improve upon, it is a small step towards a necessary goal.
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